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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Decades ago, Francis McGovern developed the idea of “maturity” in mass 
torts.1 Mass controversies need time to develop—time for the parties to learn the 
contours of the litigation; the answers to contested legal, scientific, or evidentiary 
questions; and the strengths and weaknesses of the various claims—before any 
lasting comprehensive resolution can be reached.2 In other words, mass tort 
litigation matures with age. But litigation is not like a twelve-year old Connemara 
single malt or a 1949 Cos d’Estournel.3 We don’t have to sit around and wait for 
nature to run its course. Procedure can help speed the process by which mass 
torts mature. Multidistrict litigation (MDL) is one of those procedures.4 
Consolidating mass tort cases in front of a single MDL judge for pretrial 
proceedings can contribute to maturation.5 The MDL judge can oversee common 
discovery, avoid wasteful duplication of effort or counterproductive races to 
judgment, and create conditions for the development and exchange of 
information that can help the parties value their cases.6 The judge can conduct 
bellwether trials to establish data points based on real jury outcomes that help 
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 1.  Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 659 (1989). 
 2.  Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 1843–45 
(1995). 
 3.  Francis had excellent taste. His coauthor has been known to drink Lone Star. 
 4.  28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 5.  Aggregation for pretrial proceedings is often appropriate at a much earlier stage of maturity 
than aggregation for settlement or trial. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT ON MASS 
TORT LITIGATION 21 (Feb. 15, 1999) (“In some cases, multidistrict consolidation for pretrial purposes 
may be appropriate even if the litigation has not matured to the point of supporting aggregation for 
settlement or trial by class action or other means.”). 
 6.  See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1290–91 (2017). 
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inform settlement negotiations. All of this can accelerate the point at which the 
parties know enough about the litigation to be able to craft some resolution that 
will stick. And having all (or nearly all) of the players together in a single forum 
can set the stage for a global resolution, which may benefit all involved.7 
Indeed, MDL consolidation has been an enormously successful strategy for 
efficiently managing and resolving many mass tort cases. This has been 
particularly true for cases involving single-event mass disasters or defective 
products sold by a single defendant, even when thousands of plaintiffs are 
involved. Large controversies, such as the BP oil spill, the NFL concussion 
litigation, the Volkswagen “clean” diesel scandal, the Vioxx litigation, and 
numerous product liability, pharmaceutical, and medical device cases have been 
successfully resolved through comprehensive settlements negotiated while the 
cases were pending in MDLs.8 
But in “mega mass torts”—those involving multiple defendants and multiple 
products and activities over extended periods of time (for example, asbestos, 
silicone gel breast implants, opioids)—comprehensive resolution has proven 
elusive.9 The single MDL judge handling these mega mass tort cases can become 
a bottleneck. There are only so many motions one judge can decide, so many 
discovery disputes one judge can resolve, and so many bellwether trials one judge 
can conduct. Delays can stretch out as other cases languish in the queue. In the 
asbestos litigation, for example, aggregating the cases into an MDL for pretrial 
discovery, conducting individual trials, and seeking global settlement resulted in 
a twenty-year hiatus from which no comprehensive resolution emerged.10 
Here, we propose a “hub-and-spoke” model of MDL case management for 
these sorts of mega mass torts that takes advantage of the nationwide scope of 
the federal judiciary to relieve pressure at the bottleneck. The idea is to initially 
consolidate all related cases in a single MDL (the hub) for common discovery 
and pretrial management, during which the MDL judge will identify sensible 
groupings of parties and claims for strategic disaggregation as test cases. Those 
test cases will then be remanded to other federal judges (the spokes) to allow the 
 
 7.  See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 1183 (2013) (examining conditions under which global resolution can create a peace premium); 
Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 733, 760–63 (1997). 
 8.  The structure of these settlements varies. Sometimes the parties use the class action device to 
try to fold as many potential claimants as possible into the deal. Other times they craft non-class global 
settlement programs that are offered to all plaintiffs on the same terms. Most commonly the defendant 
will enter into a series of confidential inventory settlements with various plaintiffs’ lawyers. But the goal 
is generally the same—to wrap up the litigation comprehensively. See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the 
Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 1944–46 (2017) (distinguishing global and 
inventory settlements). 
 9.  See, e.g., McGovern, Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 2, at 1836–38 (discussing characteristics 
of “mega mass torts”). 
 10.  Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-
875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97 (2013) (surveying the twenty-plus year history 
of the asbestos litigation). 
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litigation to move forward through further pretrial development, bellwether 
trials, and potential piecemeal settlements. The test cases can then proceed in 
parallel with the cases still in the hub MDL to speed the process of maturation, 
much in the same way that a computer can handle complex tasks faster through 
parallel processing than through serial processing.11 The hub MDL judge may 
also retain jurisdiction over a common issue or party, such as punitive damages 
or, in the opioid litigation, a “negotiation class,”12 to provide a ready forum for a 
potential global resolution should the information generated in the spokes make 
one possible. 
The theory behind the hub-and-spoke model is that this type of mega mass 
tort MDL is too varied for either a simultaneous trial or a single, simultaneous 
global settlement. At the same time, without aggregation in an MDL, the 
unconsolidated mass tort would result in massive duplication of discovery and 
other litigation costs, the potential for inconsistent judgments, and reduced 
chances for comprehensive settlements. Without giving up the benefits of 
aggregation, the hub-and-spoke model seeks to transform a single unmanageable 
litigation into multiple manageable litigations, but to do so strategically, in much 
the same way that a trial judge might sever parties or issues in a single case into 
more digestible components. 
One key to the model is to put the MDL transferee judge—not the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML)—in charge of quarterbacking the 
strategic disaggregation. The multidistrict litigation statute assigns the formal 
power to transfer and remand cases into and out of an MDL to the seven federal 
judges appointed by the Chief Justice to the JPML.13 But, having overseen the 
initial common discovery, decided motions, potentially tried some bellwether 
cases, and gotten a handle on the contours of the litigation, the MDL judge is best 
positioned to identify rational groupings of cases to recommend to the JPML for 
remand. The MDL judge will have a better sense of which bellwether cases will 
generate the most useful information and be the most likely to drive the litigation 
towards resolution. The JPML should thus play a secondary, supervisory role and 
not attempt to slice and dice the litigation on its own.14 
This process of systematic aggregation followed by strategic disaggregation 
can speed the maturation of mega mass torts. The hub-and-spoke model offers 
advantages over both total aggregation and no aggregation, and it can increase 
 
 11.  See Suggestion of Remand at 3 & n.3, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 
(J.P.M.L. Nov. 19, 2019) (“‘Parallel processing’ is a mode of operation in which a process is split into 
parts, which are executed simultaneously by different processors. In contrast, ‘serial processing’ employs 
a single processor, which executes the entire process in a linear sequence. Parallel processing is usually 
far more efficient. Applied here, parallel processing of the Opiate MDL calls for more than one trial 
judge working at the same time on different parts of the case.”). 
 12.  See Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative 
Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2020). 
 13.  28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 14.  This is consistent with the JPML’s usual practice of remanding cases only at the suggestion of 
the MDL transferee judge. See J.P.M.L. R. P. 10.1(b); 10.3(a). 
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the chances for finality in mega mass tort cases through a variety of settlement 
structures. 
We begin in Part II by describing the bottleneck that can develop in mega 
mass torts and discuss the different approaches taken by the judges handling the 
asbestos and silicone gel breast implant MDLs. In Part III, we describe the hub-
and-spoke model of MDL case management and some of the advantages it holds 
over other approaches to mega mass tort litigation. Finally, in Part IV we examine 
the hub-and-spoke model in action in the National Prescription Opiates MDL. 
Francis served as a special master in the opioids litigation, and at his suggestion, 
Judge Dan Aaron Polster has expressly adopted and begun to implement a hub-
and-spoke approach. 
II 
BOTTLENECKS IN MEGA-MASS TORTS 
Complex litigation scholars vigorously debate whether an MDL more closely 
resembles a black hole or a roach motel because very few cases are ever actually 
remanded out of an MDL.15 But it is not a problem that cases check in to an MDL 
and never check out if they are being satisfactorily resolved in the MDL. And for 
certain types of mass torts where the universe of cases is relatively well defined, 
MDL aggregation has been largely successful at resolving cases. Sometimes large 
swaths of cases can be resolved through dispositive motions on common issues.16 
Other times, simply gathering all of the important players in a single courtroom 
can lay the groundwork for a global settlement or a comprehensive series of 
inventory settlements, which can leave all parties better off.17 To be sure, there 
are important questions about whether particular settlements are fair to all 
plaintiffs and whether agency costs siphon off too much of the surplus.18 But the 
model largely works for cases involving a small number of defendants, a single 
defective product, or a single-event mass disaster—even when the number of 
plaintiffs may be very large. 
The gravitational force of an MDL becomes much more problematic when 
many cases in the MDL are left in a perpetual state of suspended animation. And 
in mega mass torts—those involving multiple defendants and multiple products 
or incidents over an extended period of time—the MDL judge can sometimes 
become a bottleneck.19 This is no knock on MDL judges. There are only so many 
 
 15.  Fewer than 3% as of 2013, according to one study. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding 
Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 400–01 (2014). 
 16.  See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Common Questions in MDL Proceedings, 66 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 219, 221 (2017). 
 17.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 224 (2007). 
 18.  See generally ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS (2019); see also Bradt & 
Rave, Information-Forcing, supra note 6; Linda Mullenix, Policing MDL Non-Class Settlements: 
Empowering Judges Through the All Writs Act, 37 REV. LITIG. 129 (2018). 
 19.  For an exploration of bottlenecks in a very different context, see JOSEPH FISHKIN, 
BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014). 
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motions, discovery disputes, and bellwether trials one human being can decide, 
even with the help of capable magistrate judges, law clerks, and special masters. 
Even if we had superhuman MDL judges, however, legal constraints on the 
MDL judge’s authority contribute to the bottleneck. MDL consolidation is for 
pretrial proceedings only.20 As the Supreme Court made clear in Lexecon v. 
Milberg Weiss,21  the MDL judge does not have the power to try transferred 
cases.22 The Lexecon rule thus limits the pool of cases from which the MDL judge 
can draw in choosing bellwether trials. The MDL judge can only preside over 
trials of cases filed directly in the MDL court. But those cases might not be the 
ones where trial will yield the most useful information. They might not be a 
representative sample of the whole.23 And, particularly in a mega mass tort with 
multiple defendants and products at issue, they might not include the full range 
of parties or types of claims. Without the parties’ consent to a Lexecon waiver or 
the creative use of inter-district assignments (like when Judge Eldon Fallon sat 
by designation in the Southern District of Texas to try remanded Vioxx cases24), 
the MDL judge may not be able to use bellwether trials to generate all of the 
information the parties need to reach a broader settlement. Lexecon, in short, 
can limit the MDL’s ability to help the tort mature. 
In mega mass torts, there may be too many moving pieces for an MDL judge 
to manage all alone. And in cases with such a variety of defendants, activities, 
and theories of liability, simply gathering all of the major players in one place 
may not be enough to yield a lasting comprehensive resolution. Many plaintiffs 
and defendants may languish in the queue while the judge and lead lawyers work 
on other pieces of the litigation or strive for an ephemeral global settlement. The 
asbestos litigation is a poster child for these types of cases and shows what can 
happen when the MDL judge becomes a bottleneck. The bottleneck is not 
inevitable, however. In the silicone gel breast implants litigation, the MDL judge 
adopted an approach to mega mass tort litigation that presaged the hub-and-
spoke model we describe here. 
A.  Asbestos as a Warning 
The asbestos litigation is the ur-mega mass tort. Recognizing the variety and 
complexity of the litigation involving numerous manufacturers and products and 
countless permutations of exposure and injury over an extended period of time, 
 
 20.  28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 21.  Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  On the challenges of choosing the right cases for bellwether trials, see, e.g., Eldon E. Fallon, 
Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2323, 2325 (2008); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 606–10 (2008). 
 24.  See Alex Berenson, A Mistrial is Declared in 3rd Suit over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/13/business/a-mistrial-is-declared-in-3rd-suit-over-vioxx.html 
[https://perma.cc/VHK8-P3XQ]. 
04_RAVE & MCGOVERN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2021  3:57 PM 
26 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 84:21 
the JPML several times declined to create an asbestos MDL.25 But the litigation 
metastasized, and despite several district judges’ experimentation with creative 
forms of case management during the 1980s, it was clogging the federal court 
system. By the beginning of the 1990s, the litigation had largely matured. The 
contours of the dispute were well understood and claim values had become 
predictable, but the sheer volume of cases was overwhelming.26 In 1991, at the 
behest of eight federal judges handling asbestos litigation, the JPML transferred 
all asbestos cases pending in federal courts to Judge Charles R. Weiner in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.27 
The eight asbestos litigation judges who wrote to the JPML envisioned 
something along the lines of a hub-and-spoke model.28 Their assumption was that 
there were too many asbestos litigation defendants with too many different 
products and activities to be managed effectively by one judge. But, at the same 
time, they viewed a concerted and national approach to the litigation as 
essential.29 These judges recommended that the JPML transfer all of the cases 
into a single MDL under the auspices of a “presiding judge,” and that the Panel 
also designate multiple additional judges (preferably themselves) as MDL 
 
 25.  Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Materials Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906, 910 (J.P.M.L. 
1977) (declining to create asbestos MDL); see also In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. 
Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (noting additional refusals to transfer asbestos cases in 1980, 1985, 1986, and 
1987). 
 26.  See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure of the 
Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 266 (2005) (“[A]chieving a comprehensive settlement of 
asbestos litigation appeared to be a daunting task, for asbestos litigation, unlike any other mass tort, 
involved scores of defendants.”). 
 27.  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991). 
 28.  The judges explained: 
We are persuaded that the problem is so large and the effort to solve it so onerous that the 
asbestos crisis should not be visited on one judge. It is clear, moreover, that any attempt at 
complete fair resolution requires a concerted and national approach. We therefore request that 
the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on its own initiative revisit the question of transferring all 
asbestos personal injury cases to a single district judge for coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings under 28 United States Code section 1407 and assign those cases to a group of 
judges with a presiding judge, with further provision being made to add additional judges in the 
future. 
Letter from Hons. Walter J. Gex, III, Thomas D. Lambros, Alan H. Nevas, Richard A. Schell, Charles 
Schwartz, Jr., Charles R. Weiner, Charles R. Wolle & Rya Zobel to Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (Nov. 21, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Asbestos Judges’ Letter]. They also noted 
that negotiations for a potential nationwide settlement were taking place “under the supervision of 
Special Master Francis McGovern.” Id.; see also Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among 
Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1861–63 (1997) (recounting background of letter). 
 29.  See Asbestos Judges’ Letter, supra note 28; cf. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 
F. Supp. 415, 423 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (“Many parties have suggested that the dynamics of this litigation make 
it impractical, if not impossible, for one single judge to discharge the responsibilities of transferee 
judge . . . . Varying suggestions have been made that the Panel appoint additional transferee judges to 
handle specific issues . . . to deal with separate types of claims or defendants . . . or to divide the litigation 
along regional or circuit lines. Each of these suggestions has merit, as long as one judge has the 
opportunity to maintain overall control.”). 
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transferee judges to work with the presiding MDL judge.30 Their thinking was 
that transfer into the MDL would stay the bulk of the litigation while the 
presiding MDL judge assimilated common discovery and figured out which 
defendants were solvent. Then the presiding MDL judge could strategically farm 
work out to the additional transferee judges, who could each work on separate 
“common issues or claims.”31 Or the presiding MDL judge could remand 
representative cases against individual defendants for case-specific discovery and 
bellwether trials.32 In this manner, the traditional legal process could operate on 
disaggregated units without all the noise of mass litigation. And the results of 
these representative cases would inform the negotiations among the parties and 
potentially lay the groundwork for a comprehensive resolution. The JPML was 
amenable to such an approach; it just wanted to hear Judge Weiner’s assessment 
of the situation first.33 
Judge Weiner, however, decided to keep all of the cases centralized in the 
MDL in an attempt to orchestrate a global settlement.34 But it was not to be. In 
1994, Judge Weiner certified a settlement class action for claims against twenty 
or so defendants.35 And contemporaneously a separate class action settlement 
was reached with another manufacturer.36 But the Supreme Court nixed both 
 
 30.  Asbestos Judges’ Letter, supra note 28 (“[I]t may be helpful for each of the undersigned judges 
to be designated as transferee judges sitting in each of the 94 districts for this litigation.”). 
 31.  The judges elaborated on the thinking behind this model: 
In our judgment, transfer of these cases will assist the courts in addressing the following goals: 
1. It will permit a coordinated effort to determine which defendants, if any, have limited 
funds. 
2. It will facilitate global settlements. 
3. It will provide a mechanism for uniform case management. 
4. It will permit us to fully explore other national disposition techniques such as classes 
and subclasses under Rule 23. 
5. It will permit the workload to be spread among judges so that individual judges may 
separately direct their efforts to consolidated common issues or claims. 
6. It will avoid the potential for inconsistent decisions from courts of appeals. 
7. It will avoid inconsistent pretrial rulings. 
Id. 
 32.  Cf. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (“It may 
well be that on further refinement of the issues and close scrutiny by the transferee court, some claims or 
actions can be remanded in advance of the other actions in the transferee district.”). The JPML also 
contemplated enlisting additional spoke judges who could travel with the remanded cases to relieve 
docket congestion in overburdened districts. See id. (“We add that . . . § 1407 transfer may serve as a 
mechanism enabling the transferee court to develop a nationwide roster of senior district and other 
judges available to follow actions remanded back to heavily impacted districts, for trials in advance of 
when such districts’ overburdened judges may have otherwise been able to schedule them.”). 
 33.  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 423-24 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (“We 
emphasize our intention to do everything within our power to provide such assistance in this docket. 
Before making any specific appointments, however, we deem it advisable to allow the transferee judge 
to make his own assessment of the needs of this docket and communicate his preferences to us.”). 
 34.  Robreno, supra note 10, at 112 (“Immediately after MDL-875 was transferred, Judge Weiner 
undertook an effort to achieve such a global resolution.”). 
 35.  Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 36.  Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
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deals in Amchem Products v. Windsor37 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard.38 During the 
time the class action settlements were working their way up on appeal, the federal 
cases in the MDL largely remained at a standstill.39 As a result, the primary action 
shifted to state courts, which continued to set cases for trial, and thousands of 
claims were resolved through piecemeal inventory settlements, often negotiated 
between consortiums of defendants and specialized plaintiffs’ firms.40 Eventually, 
most of the major asbestos manufacturers sought protection in bankruptcy, 
relegating many plaintiffs to recovery through asbestos trusts.41 
The federal MDL, in other words, had become a bottleneck. It wasn’t until a 
new MDL judge, Eduardo Robreno, took over in 2008 that the federal cases 
began moving again. As Judge Robreno explained: 
After nearly twenty years of intensive litigation in the federal courts, it seemed apparent 
to the court that efforts toward aggregation of cases and consolidation of claims had 
proven ineffective. Aggregation stopped progress on individual cases while the parties 
and the court worked on global solutions. Once the global solutions proved unfeasible, 
the parties did not return to the task of processing the cases individually. Ultimately, 
neither the court nor the parties were ready, willing, or able to move cases to trial and 
settlement. This stage of litigation led some litigants to refer to MDL-875 as a ‘black 
hole,’ where cases disappeared forever from the active dockets of the court.42 
Judge Robreno gave up on any attempt at global resolution and began a process 
of systematic disaggregation and remand. He severed punitive damages claims 
across the board for retention in the MDL.43 And he further severed cases down 
to the lowest common denominator until each case consisted of one plaintiff with 
one claim.44 He then placed the deconstructed cases on an accelerated schedule 
towards trial—either in front of himself, if the parties waived Lexecon, or in front 
of a cadre of senior judges who agreed to expeditiously try asbestos cases on 
remand.45 Judge Robreno remanded more than 750 cases, and by 2013 had largely 
resolved the vast majority of the more than 185,000 cases then remaining in the 
asbestos MDL.46 
 
 37.  521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 38.  527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 39.  Hensler, supra note 26, at 269 (“The long effort to achieve a class action settlement in the 
multidistrict litigation stayed litigation against CCR in the federal courts. Federal cases against other 
defendants also remained at a stand-still as Judge Weiner declined motions to remand cases for trial to 
the district courts in which they had been filed.”). 
 40.  Id. at 269–70; see also id. at 263–64 (describing practices of top plaintiffs’ firms and defendants’ 
formation of the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR)); Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Litigation: The 
Unattended Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 593–95 (2007). 
 41.  Hensler, supra note 26, at 271–75. 
 42.  Robreno, supra note 34, at 126. 
 43.  Id. at 145–46. 
 44.  Id. at 127. 
 45.  Id. at 146–47. 
 46.  Id. at 156, 180. 
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B. Breast Implants 
In the silicone gel breast implants MDL, Judge Sam Pointer took a different 
approach to handling a mega mass tort. Like the asbestos cases, the silicone gel 
breast implants litigation involved several manufacturers and dozens of products 
marketed over an extended period of time.47 The defendants had different 
involvement with the development of silicone gel breast implants and had 
different financial situations. The JPML transferred all of the federal breast 
implant cases to Judge Pointer in the Northern District of Alabama in 1992.48 
And, as in the asbestos litigation, Judge Pointer initially sought to orchestrate a 
global settlement. In 1994, he conditionally certified a $4.25 billion class action 
settlement with four of the major defendants. But the deal collapsed after far 
more plaintiffs than anticipated registered claims in the settlement, and one of 
the defendants sought protection in bankruptcy.49 Recognizing that he could not 
resolve the entire controversy in a global settlement, Judge Pointer began the 
process of disaggregating the litigation.50 
In July 1995, Judge Pointer started to remand groups of cases back to their 
transferor courts. In one group of cases remanded to the District of Oregon, 
Judge Robert Jones appointed a panel of advisors to assist him in evaluating the 
parties’ scientific evidence.51 Acting on the advice of the science panel, Judge 
Jones excluded the plaintiffs’ causation evidence under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.52 and entered summary judgment on more than 70 cases.53 
Learning from this process, Judge Pointer later appointed a national science 
panel whose findings informed many other cases that had been remanded.54 
Judge Pointer also worked closely with state court judges handling parallel 
breast implant litigation to farm some work out to the state courts. As Judge 
Pointer described it: 
In the breast implant litigation, for example, we have found opportunities for state 
judges to accept primary responsibility for particular portions of the common discovery 
program—such as development of standard interrogatories—or to take the lead in 
resolving difficult issues of state law that federal courts will face in diversity cases. While 
these efforts have not been totally successful, we are learning how judges from different 
 
 47.  See generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND 
THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996). 
 48.  In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992). 
 49.  See David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 457, 480 (1999) (“One 
reason the parties were unable to agree to a new settlement is that thousands of women, often those with 
the best cases to present to a jury, and including all of O’Quinn’s clients, chose to forego settlement and 
sue individually. Dow Corning declared bankruptcy, throwing the settlement talks into limbo.”) 
 50.  See Francis E. McGovern, Judicial Centralization and Devolution in Mass Torts, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 2077, 2088 (1997) (“Judge Pointer has practiced judicial devolution, or subsidiarity, in sending cases 
back to other courts for orderly trials and disposition.”). 
 51.  Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392–93 (D. Or. 1996). 
 52.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 53.  Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1414–15 
 54.  See id. at 1394 & n.18. 
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courts can work together as a team, complementing each other and sharing the burdens 
such litigation imposes on the judiciary.55 
Ultimately, the disaggregated breast implants MDL resulted in class action 
settlements for two defendants, inventory settlements for three defendants, 
bankruptcy for one defendant, and remands for several thousand individual 
cases. By strategically disaggregating the litigation once it became clear that 
global resolution was not possible, Judge Pointer avoided becoming a bottleneck. 
III 
THE HUB-AND-SPOKE MODEL OF CASE MANAGEMENT 
Our hub-and-spoke model for MDL case management in mega mass torts 
draws on the lessons of the asbestos and breast implants litigation. More so than 
simply aggregating cases, the hub-and-spoke model takes full advantage of the 
national scope of the federal court system to handle our largest controversies. 
Bringing more judges into the process can alleviate pressure at the bottleneck. 
But by keeping coordination in the hub, the benefits of aggregation are not lost. 
A. How it Works 
The hub-and-spoke model of MDL case management is one of systematic 
aggregation followed by strategic disaggregation. It proceeds in five basic steps: 
1. Aggregate mass tort cases into a single MDL (the hub). 
2. Commence common discovery and pretrial case management. 
3. Identify similarities and differences among plaintiffs, defendants, causes of 
action, and remedies. 
4. Strategically disaggregate the mass tort by remanding test cases or groups 
of cases to transferor courts (the spokes). 
5. Maintain the hub MDL as a forum for potential global or partial 
settlements. 
We consider these steps in turn. 
1.  Aggregate Mass Torts Into a Single MDL (the Hub) 
Once a mega mass tort is identified, the JPML should consolidate all of the 
cases pending in federal courts into a single MDL, which will become the hub. 
Later-filed cases should be transferred into the MDL as tagalong actions. State 
courts should be encouraged to consolidate related cases as well through any 
MDL-like procedures they have at the state-level.56 And the federal MDL judge 
should attempt to coordinate with state judges handling related cases. All of this 
is standard practice for mass tort MDLs.57 The scope of the consolidation can be 
broad, as the end game need not be a single global settlement. The primary goal 
 
 55.  Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Reflections by a Federal Judge: A Comment on Judicial Federalism: A 
Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (1995). 
 56.  Approximately half the states have some form of state MDL procedure. Zachary D. Clopton & 
D. Theodore Rave, MDL in the States, 115 NW. L. REV. 1649, 1658–59 (2021). 
 57.  See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004). 
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at this point is to corral the potentially unruly litigation and shift it into a more 
orderly process where conscious case management can help it mature without 
costly duplicative discovery or counterproductive races to judgment. 
Aggregation, at this point, can be maximalist.58 
2. Commence Common Discovery and Pretrial Case Management 
After aggregation, the MDL transferee judge should start managing the 
litigation to figure out what it is all about. The judge should commence common 
discovery and use all of the case management tools at his or her disposal to learn 
the contours of the litigation and to help the parties develop and exchange the 
kinds of information that drive cases toward resolution. Plaintiff and defendant 
fact sheets may be helpful.59 Working with magistrate judges or special masters 
may be helpful. The judge may wish to have the parties work up and try one or 
more bellwether cases. Again, this is the bread and butter of what MDL judges 
do in big cases, though in a mega mass tort, the task may be daunting and the 
judge unable to devote full attention to every party or issue.60 The important 
point is that active case management puts the hub MDL judge in a good position 
to figure out whether and how to disaggregate the litigation. 
3. Identify Similarities and Differences Among Plaintiffs, Defendants, 
Causes of Action, and Remedies 
In the course of pretrial management, the hub MDL judge should analyze the 
litigation as a whole to determine whether it is too large for one judge to handle 
alone. If so, the judge should identify similarities and differences among the cases 
to try to figure out how to strategically break up the litigation. There will be no 
one-size-fits all formula for how to do this. But the judge should try to identify 
logical groupings of plaintiffs, defendants, causes of action, theories of recovery, 
and the like, that could be broken off from the main litigation into manageable 
pieces. Working with the lawyers on both sides, the hub MDL judge will be in a 
good position to identify the major fault lines in the litigation and the sets of 
issues that need to be decided before any sort of resolution is possible. From there 
the judge can determine which groupings of cases and issues would make the 
most sense for further development as a unit and what sorts of bellwether trials 
would yield the best information. The hub MDL judge can further streamline the 
 
 58.  See Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use 
of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2249–50 (2008). 
 59.  For recent guidance on fact sheets, see MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, JASON A. CANTONE & 
EMERY G. LEE III, PLAINTIFF FACT SHEETS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS: A GUIDE 
FOR TRANSFEREE JUDGES (FJC 2019); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 
YALE L.J. 1, 56–60 (2019) (“Plaintiff fact sheets, in the words of leading defense lawyer Sheila Birnbaum, 
offer ‘a relatively clear and objective snapshot of the merits underlying each claim,’ making them an 
efficient vehicle to obtain this valuable information.”). 
 60.  The shift toward managerial judging began decades ago, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982), and modern MDL judges are some of its most enthusiastic 
practitioners. 
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cases in these groupings by severing parties or claims to craft test cases that will 
provide the most useful information for the parties in settlement negotiations.61 
4. Strategically Disaggregate the Mass Tort by Remanding Test Cases or 
Groups of Cases to Transferor Courts (the Spokes) 
The hub MDL judge should recommend to the JPML that the test cases from 
the identified groupings be remanded back to their transferor districts for further 
development and bellwether trials. The JPML has tremendous flexibility in 
structuring the litigation that it transfers into and out of an MDL.62 And it should 
take full advantage of its power to strategically separate and remand the claims 
identified by the hub MDL judge to various spokes. 
By strategically remanding test cases, the JPML can unclog the bottleneck 
created when all the cases in a mega mass tort are run through a single MDL 
judge. The spoke judges can then proceed in parallel with each other and the hub 
judge to oversee case-specific discovery and motions and to try the test cases. The 
results of these cases can serve as bellwethers for the rest of the litigation, sending 
valuable signals to the parties about the strength, weaknesses, and valuations of 
different categories of cases. The hub-and-spoke model thus takes full advantage 
of the national scope of the federal judiciary to address nationwide mass tort 
litigation. And the sort of parallel processing that the hub-and-spoke model 
enables can speed up the time it takes for the mass tort to reach maturity. 
The hub-and-spoke model puts the MDL transferee judge—not the JPML—
in charge of figuring out how best to disaggregate the litigation. Of course, only 
the JPML has the power to remand cases back to their transferor courts.63 But 
the MDL judge will typically be in a far better position than the JPML to figure 
out which cases should be remanded and when. The JPML already recognizes 
the MDL judge’s informational advantages, and it should continue to follow its 
general practice of not remanding cases without first receiving a “suggestion of 
 
 61.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 gives district courts broad discretion to sever even properly 
joined claims or parties. See 7 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE § 1689 (3d ed. 2019). District courts may also “order a separate trial of one or more 
separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
Streamlining test cases by separating out claims under Rule 42(b) may, however, create complications if 
only some of the claims are remanded while others remain pending in the MDL, as there is some question 
whether resolution of either separated claim would yield a final appealable judgment. See, e.g., Rollins v. 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 737 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2013); DAVID F. HERR, 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 5:58 (2019). Formal severance under Rule 21 avoids any such 
ambiguity. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 
2003). The MDL judge may also be able to streamline test cases by persuading plaintiffs eager for a 
remand to dismiss peripheral claims or defendants voluntarily. 
 62.  The MDL statute expressly gives the JPML the power to “separate any claim, cross-claim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is 
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). This power has been interpreted broadly to give the JPML the power 
to carve up and shape multidistrict litigation claim-by-claim in whatever manner best serves the just and 
efficient conduct of the litigation. See, e.g., In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 811 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding 
JPML’s decision in asbestos litigation to separate and keep in MDL claims for punitive damages while 
remanding claims for compensatory damages). 
 63.  28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
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remand” from the transferee judge.64 But while the JPML should generally defer 
to the hub MDL judge’s considered choices, it should not be a rubber stamp. The 
hub-and-spoke model concentrates additional power in the hands of an already 
powerful figure whose pretrial rulings are subject to limited appellate oversight.65 
By playing a secondary, supervisory role, the JPML can provide an important 
backstop against the hub MDL judge going rogue. 
In strategically disaggregating the litigation, the JPML should work with the 
hub judge and the chief judge of the transferor court to identify suitable judges 
to act as spokes. Because the idea is to generate useful information to facilitate 
settlement in the larger litigation, it is critical that the spoke judges be willing and 
able to move the cases forward expeditiously. We don’t want to recreate 
additional bottlenecks. This may strike some as an alarming departure from the 
ordinary practice of randomly assigning cases to judges.66 But the entire MDL 
system departs radically from the random case assignment norm.67 It is, however, 
another reason to have the JPML—the entity statutorily tasked with moving 
cases around the federal court system in a nonrandom manner—retain ultimate 
responsibility for which cases go where. 
5. Maintain the Hub MDL as a Forum for Potential Global or Partial 
Settlements 
 The hub MDL should be maintained as a potential forum for settlement. 
Mega mass torts, by definition, have so many moving parts that a truly global 
settlement may be unlikely. But should one become possible after the parties 
have internalized the information generated in the spokes, the hub MDL may 
prove useful to effectuate it. Ideally, in strategically disaggregating the litigation, 
the MDL judge would retain control over some vehicle to bring the parties back 
to the hub for settlement. The hub MDL might retain jurisdiction over a key issue 
common to all parties, such as punitive damages. This was the approach in the 
asbestos MDL. Or the hub might hang on to a key defendant, such as a major 
 
 64.  See J.P.M.L. R. 10.1(b); id. 10.3(a) (“the Panel is reluctant to order a remand absent the 
suggestion of the transferee judge”); see also In re Holiday Magic Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 
1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (“In considering the question of remand, the Panel has consistently given 
great weight to the transferee judge’s determination that remand of a particular action at a particular 
time is appropriate because the transferee judge, after all, supervises the day-to-day pretrial 
proceedings.”). The JPML has seldom, if ever, remanded cases without the suggestion of the MDL judge. 
See Burch, supra note 15, at 418. 
 65.  See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the 
Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1706 (2017) (“The fact that pretrial 
orders are not routinely appealable under 28 U.S.C § 1291 is clearly an enormous factor, with a variety 
of implications.”). 
 66.  Of course, not all case assignments in the federal courts are random, but randomness is the 
prevailing norm for most cases. See generally Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the 
Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 67.  See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 1333 (2020) (“[W]hen 
the Panel selects a judge to handle an MDL, it abandons the typical mode of judicial assignment, i.e., 
random assignment within a district.”). Indeed, nonrandom case assignment is a defining feature of 
institutional MDL systems in state courts as well. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 56 at 1705. 
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distributor or insurer involved in nearly all of the claims. Or the MDL judge 
might create a procedural vehicle, like the negotiation class in the opioid 
litigation, to bring parties back to the hub.68 Any of these options might lay the 
groundwork for a global deal. 
But achieving a truly global settlement in the hub is not essential to the hub-
and-spoke model; often it may not even be a realistic goal. If the hub judge has 
done a good job identifying similarities and differences among parties and issues 
and choosing test cases, however, then information generated in the spokes may 
make it possible to resolve substantial portions of the litigation. A variety of 
settlement structures are possible. Individual cases or groups of cases might settle 
in the spokes on remand. And even those settlements may yield useful 
information for the parties remaining in the hub.69 One or more defendants may 
wish to resolve their liability as to all plaintiffs, or just some groups of plaintiffs 
with cases still pending in the hub. And they may do so through aggregate 
inventory settlements (plaintiffs’ firm by plaintiffs’ firm), class action settlements, 
or master settlements offers open to all plaintiffs. Whether settlements proceed 
defendant-by-defendant or inventory-by-inventory, keeping the hub MDL up 
and running provides a ready forum for such negotiations. And if no settlements 
are forthcoming, the hub judge can, of course, remand more cases to the spokes 
for additional trials. 
B. Advantages Over Other Models 
The hub-and-spoke model will not be needed in every mass tort MDL. Mass 
torts come in all shapes and sizes that call for different case management 
strategies. But for mega mass torts, the hub-and-spoke model of systematic 
aggregation and strategic disaggregation holds several advantages over 
alternatives, including total aggregation, no aggregation, and aggregation 
followed by automatic disaggregation. 
1. Advantages Over Total Aggregation 
Aggregation maximalists insist that total aggregation is the only option for 
mass torts.70 But we developed the hub-and-spoke model primarily in response 
to problems we’ve observed with total (or near total) aggregation in some cases. 
As the asbestos litigation demonstrated, some mega mass torts are simply too 
varied for a single, global resolution and too large for a single judge to manage 
without becoming a bottleneck. Even if a “control freak” judge manages to cajole 
the parties into a global settlement by, for example, withholding adjudication as 
transaction costs mount, the deal is unlikely to stick.71 By strategically breaking 
 
 68.  See infra notes 103–105 and accompanying text (discussing opioids negotiation class). 
 69.  See Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2292 (2017) 
(“When the endgame is a global settlement, a focused sampling of arm’s-length negotiations may help 
counsel better identify solutions from the ground up.”). 
 70.  See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort 
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002). 
 71.  McGovern, Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 2, at 1844–45. 
04_RAVE & MCGOVERN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2021  3:57 PM 
No. 2 2021] A HUB-AND-SPOKE MODEL OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 35 
these mega cases up into multiple manageable pieces, the hub-and-spoke model 
can help open the bottleneck and prevent them from becoming black holes. 
The hub-and-spoke model also offers some specific advantages over total 
aggregation. Enlisting the help of spoke judges to conduct bellwether trials in 
transferor districts can increase the pool of cases eligible for bellwether 
treatment. The transferor judges in the spokes are not constrained by Lexecon, 
so bellwether cases can be selected for their informational value not simply 
because they were directly filed in the MDL or because the parties are willing to 
consent to trial there.72 There can also be value in trying bellwether cases in front 
of several different judges with a diversity of perspectives.73 Those judges may be 
more familiar with relevant state law applicable in diversity suits than the distant 
MDL judge, and the cases would be tried in front of juries from different parts of 
the country.74 As a result, trying bellwether cases in the spokes might, in some 
situations, provide the parties with better data points to inform their settlement 
negotiations. Finally, strategic disaggregation of the litigation into discrete, 
manageable pieces may set the stage for multiple smaller settlements of 
substantial portions of the litigation in lieu of an ephemeral global resolution. 
2. Advantages Over No Aggregation 
If aggregation causes a bottleneck in mega mass torts, why use judicial 
mechanisms like MDL to aggregate at all? Why not just leave it to the 
marketplace of litigation where parties have access to disaggregated 
decisionmakers? 
The arguments in favor of aggregation are well-rehearsed.75 To name a few: 
it avoids wasteful duplication of discovery; it avoids the potential for inconsistent 
judgments; it creates economies of scale for plaintiffs, defendants, and courts 
alike; and it may set the stage for comprehensive settlements that leave all parties 
better off. Indeed, the pressures toward aggregation within or outside the formal 
procedural system may be inexorable.76 
 
 72.  On some of the complications presented by directly filed cases, see Andrew D. Bradt, The 
Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
759 (2012). 
 73.  See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of 
Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008); cf. J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance 
in the Post-Class Action Era: The Problems and Promise of Non-Removable State Actions in Multi-District 
Litigation, 5 J. Tort Law 3 (2012). 
 74.  See Burch, Remanding, supra note 15, at 407–09. 
 75.  For an earlier analysis by one of us, see Rave, supra note 7. For a classic treatment, see Silver & 
Baker, supra note 7, at 744–49, (observing that plaintiffs can gain important advantages by suing 
collectively including economies of scale litigation costs, increased leverage in settlement negotiations, 
equalization of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ risks, and the conservation of defendants’ assets). 
 76.  See generally Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: 
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004) (describing pressures to 
resolve tort claims through “bureaucratized, aggregate settlement structures” dating back to the 
Nineteenth Century). 
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Here we highlight two additional arguments for initial aggregation of mega 
mass torts in MDLs, even if later disaggregation is expected. In other words, we 
explain why the hub-and-spoke model is superior to no aggregation or a laissez-
faire approach to the mass tort litigation market. 
First, MDL consolidation facilitates collective action. While plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have been known to complain bitterly when their cases are swept up into 
a distant MDL, being forced to work with other plaintiffs’ lawyers in the MDL 
helps solve a collective action problem.77 By setting up a leadership structure and 
a common benefit fund, the MDL judge can reduce freeriding and better 
incentivize lead lawyers to invest in work that will benefit all of the plaintiffs.78 
MDLs attract sophisticated lawyers with the means to invest in the litigation on 
something approaching the same scale as the defendants, which is particularly 
important in mega mass torts where it may be years before plaintiffs see any 
recoveries and their lawyers see any return on investment.79 And those lawyers 
will often be repeat players with the experience and wherewithal to play for rules 
and maximize the value of whole series of cases.80 
Contrast that with a world of no MDL aggregation where many plaintiffs may 
be represented by lawyers who cannot match the defendants’ resources and 
repeat-player advantages. While the defendants play the odds and play for rules, 
one-shot lawyers may settle strong cases or push weak ones to trial without taking 
into account the effects those decisions would have on the rest of the plaintiffs’ 
cases.81 And the lawyers who have the resources to go toe-to-toe with the 
defendants will lack the proper incentive to invest in common benefit work 
because other lawyers will freeride on their efforts.82 Substantive outcomes will 
surely be skewed by this mismatch. 
 
 77.  See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers 
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1312–14 (2018) (describing 
how centralization facilitates collective action). 
 78.  See generally Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 
371 (2014) (describing how plaintiffs’ fees are structured in MDL to encourage attorneys to effectively 
lead the litigation). 
 79.  See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 
1952 (2017) (noting that it may take years and cost more than $250,000 to litigate a science-heavy tort 
claim). 
 80.  Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side: A Defense 
of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J. 73, 93–98 (2019). Repeat players come with 
dangers too, of course. See id. at 78, 100–01 (acknowledging that repeat players can exacerbate agency 
costs in the client-lawyer relationship); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat 
Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2017). But we suspect 
that, on balance, they add more value than they siphon off in agency costs. 
 81.  Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 100–04 (1974). 
 82.  See Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDL, 70 DEPAUL L. 
REV.  (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 16), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3680074 
[https://perma.cc/2R9C-HRGT]. 
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Second, the hub-and-spoke MDL model can avoid some of the inequities of 
disaggregated litigation. Judicial resources are finite and can easily be 
overwhelmed by a mega mass tort. But mass tort litigation is not an efficient 
market where the price mechanism sorts cases such that the highest value users 
of the judicial system have first access to court procedures. The asbestos litigation 
is replete with nightmare stories of plaintiffs litigating nonmalignant pleural 
thickening claims while other plaintiffs die of mesothelioma with their cases still 
languishing in the queue. And there is a real risk in many mega mass torts that 
the defendants’ assets will be exhausted before many plaintiffs’ claims are 
heard.83 
Systematic initial aggregation in an MDL can help rationalize—and ration—
the process of adjudication in a mega mass tort. Consolidating all of the cases in 
an MDL effectively stays the bulk of the litigation. Instead of plaintiffs racing 
each other to courthouses all over the country, the hub MDL judge can make a 
conscious decision about which cases to focus on first—whether it’s those with 
the most severe injuries, those with the strongest claims, or those that will yield 
the most useful information to help the parties reach a broader settlement. Once 
the hub MDL judge has identified rational groupings of parties and claims, 
remand to the spokes can recapture many of the benefits of disaggregated 
litigation and drive the tort toward maturity more quickly and equitably. And if, 
as the tort matures, global or partial settlements become feasible and attractive 
to the parties, the hub MDL remains available as a forum to assist with 
consummating the deal or deals. 
3. Advantages Over Aggregation Followed by Automatic Disaggregation 
A superficial reading of the MDL statute might suggest that the JPML should 
automatically remand the cases en masse once common discovery is complete or 
at some other moment when pretrial proceedings are deemed to have reached 
their “conclusion.”84 That was never the intent of the statute’s drafters, who fully 
expected most cases to be resolved within the MDL forum and who crafted the 
statute to give the JPML and MDL judge maximum flexibility to manage the 
litigation toward efficient resolution.85 But legislative intent aside, the hub-and-
spoke model is superior to mass or automatic remands once cases have reached 
a certain point of pretrial development in the MDL. 
The whole point of the hub-and-spoke model is to disaggregate the litigation 
strategically, not mindlessly. Automatic mass remand would just be a return to 
chaos. Though initial consolidation would have succeeded in avoiding the costs 
 
 83.  See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 
1726 (2002) (discussing how defendants’ assets affect litigation strategy). 
 84.  28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 85.  See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 831, 839 (2017). A close reading of § 1407(a) makes it clear that the cases can be remanded at 
any time during the pretrial process, that not all cases need to be remanded at the same time, and that 
the JPML can even carve off portions of cases for early remand. 
04_RAVE & MCGOVERN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2021  3:57 PM 
38 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 84:21 
of duplicative discovery, mass remand would recreate the inequities and 
inconsistencies of disaggregated litigation and frustrate efforts at settlement. 
Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has offered a more thoughtful 
alternative for disaggregating multidistrict litigation.86 She argues that MDL 
judges should set benchmarks for episodic remands. Burch suggest three key 
intervals at which presumptive remands might be appropriate: (1) at the 
beginning of the MDL for plaintiffs whose claims fall outside the categories that 
the lead lawyers plan to develop, (2) after the close of common discovery but 
before case-specific summary judgment motions, and (3) in the wake of a global 
settlement for those plaintiffs who do not wish to settle.87 While we agree that 
episodic remands may be useful in some cases, we think that the hub-and-spoke 
model of strategic remands will be preferrable at least in some mega mass tort 
cases. 
In mega mass torts, at least, remands at the outset of the MDL, once the lead 
lawyers have been appointed and identified the initial claims and theories they 
will pursue, will often be premature. Flooding these cases back into the federal 
courts sacrifices equity and risks recreating a race to the courthouse, particularly 
in mega mass torts where total claims might exhaust the defendant’s assets. And 
disaggregating before it is clear whether a global resolution is possible could be a 
missed opportunity. As we explained above, one advantage to consolidating 
mega mass tort litigation in an MDL in the first place is that, as a practical matter, 
it temporarily stays the bulk of the litigation, giving the parties and the judge an 
opportunity to analyze the litigation as a whole and figure out the best way to 
move forward. The threat of exit is, of course, an important tool to ensure the 
loyalty of lead lawyers.88 And it would be unfair to hold hostage plaintiffs whose 
claims the lead lawyers never plan to pursue. But the plaintiffs are stronger 
together, and premature disaggregation could defeat the purpose of the collective 
venture to begin with. 
Presumptive remands at the end of common discovery may be more 
appropriate, but again we suspect that a more strategic approach will often be 
superior. In large part, our preference stems from a desire to facilitate settlement. 
MDL, like the U.S. legal system as a whole, leaves ample opportunity for and 
provides significant assistance to negotiated, rather than adjudicated, outcomes.89 
 
 86.  Burch, Remanding, supra note 1515, at 422–23; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 690–93 (2013). 
 87.  BURCH, supra note 18, at 210–14; see also Burch, Remanding, supra note 15, at 422–23 
(advocating measures to make remand more common in multidistrict litigation). 
 88.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 378–78 (2000) (describing “exit” as a governance tool 
to reduce agency costs in class action representation); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy 
in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 366–67 (same); see also Burch, Disaggregating, supra 
note 86, at 681 (arguing for exit’s importance to procedural justice, federalism, participation, and 
accuracy). 
 89.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1177, 1190–99 (2009) (arguing that the ability of a legal system to resolve mass harms through 
settlement is “an important justice value”); Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, In Defense of Private Claims 
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One of the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the discovery 
process, and, indeed, judicial case management is to encourage parties to take 
advantage of the unlimited potential solutions in negotiation rather than the 
limited recourse inherent in the legal process. Adjudication allows for only a 
certain number of outcomes, whereas the end game for negotiation has few 
restrictions. 
Strategic, rather than automatic or presumptive episodic remand, strikes us 
as more likely to facilitate settlement. Retaining the bulk of the cases in the hub 
MDL while test cases are tried in the spokes preserves opportunities for the 
parties to reach a variety of different settlement structures, whether global or 
partial. By contrast, remanding mega mass tort cases en masse at the close of 
common discovery could recreate the queue and arbitrary trial order in 
transferor courts. If they are consigned to waiting, plaintiffs might as well wait in 
the MDL, where settlement seems more likely. 
Of course, if it becomes clear that settlement will not be forthcoming even 
after information is developed in the spokes, the hub MDL judge should shift 
gears and accelerate the rate of remands, just like Judge Robreno did in the 
asbestos litigation. But even so, the disaggregation should follow a thoughtful 
strategy, considering effects on plaintiff equity. Judge Robreno, for example, held 
onto claims for punitive damages in the MDL so that they wouldn’t drain the 
defendants’ resources before other plaintiffs had a chance at compensation.90 
We have no quarrel, however, with Burch’s suggestion of post-settlement 
remands. It is possible that the ready availability of remand for plaintiffs who 
decline a settlement offer in the MDL might make it harder to achieve global 
peace because more plaintiffs opt for remand over settlement. But the 
negotiating parties should ensure peace through attractive settlement terms, not 
by leaving non-settling parties in limbo in the MDL.91 
IV 
THE PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION AS A TEST CASE 
The massive litigation stemming from the opioid crisis provides an excellent 
test case for the hub-and-spoke model of MDL case management. Francis served 
as a special master in In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation,92 and he 
convinced Judge Dan Aaron Polster to put the hub-and-spoke idea into 
practice—a decision that was later ratified by the JPML. 
The opioid litigation surely fits the definition of a mega mass tort. It involves 
claims by more than 2,800 cities, counties, and Indian tribes from across the 
 
Resolution Facilities, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2021, at 45,  (arguing that as long as the parties 
retain the option to go to court, a negotiated “alternative to the standard litigation model” is likely to 
make them better off). 
 90.  Robreno, supra note 10, at 145–46. 
 91.  See D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 
2176–77 (2017) (describing settlement terms that MDL lawyers use to ensure closure). 
 92.  MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio). 
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country along with a smattering of hospitals, third-party payors, and putative 
classes of individuals against more than one hundred defendants ranging from 
manufacturers and distributors to pharmacies and administrators of prescription 
drug programs to doctors and individuals.93 The various defendants are alleged 
to have engaged in different conduct with respect to different drugs over the 
course of decades. And the plaintiffs assert various theories of liability under 
RICO, the Controlled Substances Act, state consumer protection laws, and 
public nuisance, among others. The matter is made even more complex by the 
overlapping jurisdiction of many of the public entity plaintiffs (for example, 
cities, counties, and states may share jurisdiction over certain areas) and by the 
presence of parallel state-court litigation. Forty-nine state attorneys general have 
sued the same set of defendants in their own state courts, as have various cities, 
counties and other plaintiffs.94 And several of the state attorneys general have 
gotten into public turf fights with the plaintiff cities and counties that lie within 
their borders and are represented by private lawyers in the MDL. 
On December 5, 2017, the JPML transferred all of the opioid cases pending 
in federal courts to Judge Polster in the Northern District of Ohio for coordinated 
pretrial proceedings. Despite the complexity of the litigation, Judge Polster was 
initially bullish on the prospects of a comprehensive resolution. At the initial 
pretrial conference, he told the parties: 
People aren’t interested in depositions, and discovery, and trials. People aren’t 
interested in figuring out the answer to interesting legal questions like preemption and 
learned intermediary, or unraveling complicated conspiracy theories. So my objective 
is to do something meaningful to abate the crisis and to do it in 2018. And we have 
here—we’ve got all the lawyers. I can get the parties, and I can involve the states. So 
we’ll have everyone who is in a position to do it. And with all these smart people here 
and their clients, I’m confident we can do something to dramatically reduce the number 
of opioids that are being disseminated, manufactured, and distributed.95 
But reality soon set in. Judge Polster quickly realized that he could not simply 
strong arm the parties into settlement, and he changed tacks.96 
Although the parties had no appetite for a single, all-encompassing global 
settlement, Judge Polster wanted to lay the groundwork for potential defendant-
by-defendant settlements.97 And with help from Francis and the other special 
masters, he adopted a hub-and-spoke model of case management. Judge Polster 
oversaw common discovery and began to divide the litigation into separate tracks 
for further case development. He scheduled a bellwether trial of claims by two 
 
 93.  For a comprehensive summary of the current state of the opioid litigation, see generally 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Abbe R. Gluck, MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2021). 
 94.  State court litigation has been consolidated into state MDL proceedings in nine states. Clopton 
& Rave, Opioid Cases, supra note 82. 
 95.  Transcript of Proceedings at 4–5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. 
Ohio Jan. 9, 2018). 
 96.  See Minutes of 3/6/2018 Conference and Order at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL 
No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2018). 
 97.  Transcript of Status Conference at 4–5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 
(N.D. Ohio, Nov. 7, 2019). 
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Ohio counties against three distributors, a manufacturer and a pharmacy, over 
which he planned to preside. The two counties settled with all but one of the 
defendants on the first day of trial. 
It was clear that Judge Polster would become a bottleneck if he attempted to 
try all of the necessary bellwether cases himself. So, after analyzing the 
aggregated cases as a whole, Judge Polster worked with the parties and the 
special masters to identify representative test cases for strategic remand to the 
spokes. As Judge Polster explained: 
What the Court has learned is that, if it proceeds with the bellwether trial process as it 
has so far, it will simply take too long to reach each category of plaintiff and defendant, 
much less each individual plaintiff and defendant. Meanwhile, the Opioid Crisis shows 
no sign of ending. Accordingly, the Court asked the parties to submit proposals 
regarding limited, strategic remands of specific cases, in order to allow other federal 
judges to help resolve specific portions of the Opiate MDL in parallel. The Court 
suggested, for example, that there could be a remand of: (1) a case focused on 
manufacturers; (2) a case focused on distributors; (3) a case focused on pharmacies; (4) 
a case brought by an Indian Tribe; and so on.98 
Judge Polster kept the pharmacy bellwether for himself (with the same two 
Ohio counties as plaintiffs). And he suggested to the JPML that it remand cases 
focused on distributors, manufacturers, tribal claims, and RICO claims to federal 
courts in West Virginia, Illinois, Oklahoma, and California.99 Before remand, 
however, Judge Polster attempted to streamline the cases by severing defendants 
and conditioning remand on the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissing peripheral 
claims so that the test cases would be triable in short order in the spokes and 
focused on yielding the most useful data points for settlement.100 The JPML 
endorsed the hub-and-spoke model and, over the objection of some of the 
defendants, remanded the cases.101 While the test cases are proceeding in the 
spokes, Judge Polster continues to work in parallel in the hub, conducting 
common discovery on the remaining portions of the litigation in manageable 
stages to design similar strategic remand processes for other categories of 
defendants and claims. 
Judge Polster’s shift toward strategic disaggregation has hardly been an 
abandonment of his pursuit of settlement. Quite the contrary. As Judge Polster 
explained: 
[T]he Court believes that strategic remand of certain cases is the best way to advance 
resolution of various aspects of the Opiate MDL. The undersigned will remain as the 
‘hub’ of the MDL litigation and also the locus for global settlement, while the selected 
transferor courts will act as ‘spokes,’ supporting this global effort.102 
 
 98.  Suggestion of Remand, at 5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 
19, 2019). 
 99.  See id.; Suggestion of Remand, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L. 
Jan. 6, 2020) (Track 2 cases). 
 100.  See Order Regarding Track Two Cases, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate MDL No. 2804 (N.D. 
Ohio Nov. 21, 2019). 
 101.  Remand Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 5, 2020). 
 102.  Suggestion of Remand, supra note 98. Given the complexity of the litigation, Judge Polster likely 
envisioned a series of defendant-by-defendant or defendant-category-by-defendant-category (that is, 
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To serve as a vehicle for settlement, Judge Polster certified a novel 
“negotiation class” in the hub—yet another one of Francis’s innovations, this 
time in collaboration with Professor William Rubenstein.103 The idea behind the 
negotiation class is to make settlement attractive to a defendant by offering peace 
in exchange for a premium. If, perhaps based on information developed in the 
spokes, one of the opioid defendants wishes to settle with all of the plaintiffs in 
the MDL, it would still leave itself open to suit by the more than 30,000 other 
localities that have not filed cases in the MDL. Worse still, the plaintiffs with the 
strongest claims will be the ones most likely to opt out of any settlement once its 
terms are known. Both factors mean the defendant must hold back money to deal 
with continued litigation against the strongest claims.104 The negotiation class by 
contrast binds the plaintiffs together before any settlement is on the table. If the 
class members do not opt out at the outset, they agree to be bound by a class-
wide vote on whether to accept a lump sum settlement with the proceeds to be 
distributed according to a predetermined formula. The negotiation class thus 
allows plaintiffs to credibly guarantee the scope of the peace they are offering the 
defendant and to extract a premium in exchange.105 And its certification in the 
hub gives the parties a vehicle to return there for settlement should any defendant 
and the plaintiff localities desire it. 
It has not all been smooth sailing, however. The Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 ruling, 
reversed Judge Polster’s certification of the negotiation class, saying that the 
device goes beyond the authority granted by the text of Rule 23.106 But even if 
the negotiation class is dead (or goes unused if revived), the hub-and-spoke 
model remains in effect in the opioids litigation. And it may yet lay the 
groundwork for settlements using other structures. Even without the negotiation 
class, the bulk of the cases against the major defendants are pending in the MDL, 
so the hub remains a forum in which the parties can negotiate and consummate 
deals using a variety of settlement structures. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Mass torts come in all shapes and sizes, and no single model of case 
management will fit them all. But for mega mass torts, the hub-and-spoke model 
shows considerable promise. And it fits well with the vision of the federal courts 
as a unified national system that underlies MDL. 
 
manufacturers, dispensers, etc.) comprehensive settlements, not a single all-encompassing deal among 
all parties. In other words, the settlements would be “global” with respect to the plaintiffs included, not 
necessarily the defendants. 
 103.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 332 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ohio 2019); McGovern & 
Rubenstein, supra note 12. 
 104.  For discussion of a similar dynamic, see Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil 
Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014). 
 105.  McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 12. 
 106.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664, 677 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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The architects of the MDL statute saw the advantages of treating “the federal 
district courts [as] parts of one court rather than many courts,” and they saw 
MDL as a way to “make fuller use of the potential unity of the federal judicial 
system.”107 Indeed, the statute expressly contemplates the possibility of 
transferring cases to multiple MDL judges in the same litigation.108 But the 
predominant model of aggregation used in mass tort MDLs today does not take 
full advantage of this potential. The hub-and-spoke model does. Rather than 
allowing one judge to become a bottleneck, the hub-and-spoke model draws in 
other judges from around the federal court system to work together to advance 
the litigation. 
The hub-and-spoke model is also a terrific example of what Francis did his 
entire career. He was a firm believer that the great advantage of negotiated 
settlement is that it allows parties to reject the binary choices imposed by 
adjudication in favor of some other solution entirely. So too, the hub-and-spoke 
model of MDL rejects the binary choice between aggregation and disaggregation. 
We can use the flexibility of the MDL statute and the national scope of the 
federal judiciary to simultaneously have both the advantages of aggregation in 
hub and disaggregation in the spokes. 
 
 
 107.  Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 85, at 864 (quoting Phillip Neal, one of the main drafters of 
the MDL statute). 
 108.  28 U.S.C. § 1407(b). 
